Leverage: R.I.M. and the (various) Governments
A scan of most worldwide, business-oriented news sources will quickly find a set of stories about various national governments and Research in Motion (R.I.M.). The government list will include (at least) Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, India, and Dubai, with references to the United States and China. The core issue is this: Will R.I.M., which encrypts user email communications pretty robustly (to the point where R.I.M. says that even they cannot read users’ emails), give in to requests from the various governments to have access to said emails unencrypted, or will they risk having government-directed shutdowns of service?
As negotiators, our interest is not in the final outcome, but in the analysis of the leverage at play, and how it changes with time. Think of leverage in negotiations as the power to move the other side closer to your position.
At first, it will seem that all the leverage lies with the governments. They have legal control of the communications infrastructures in general, and have the power to stop service. A closer look will show that their interests are not all the same, and that the leverage varies. However, the leverage to stop service is large.
There are stronger and weaker ways to express it. Contrast these three statements:
- Unless you provide us with access to the encrypted data by September 1st, we will remove your ability to provide service in our country.
- Unless you provide us with access to the encrypted data by September 1st, we will remove your ability to provide service in our country, and we estimate that your revenue loss will be $7M/day.
- If you provide us with access to the encrypted data by September 1st, your revenue stream of $7M/day will be protected.
These expressions provide three views. Example 1 is a simple, time-dated leveraged threat. It falls in the category of a risk that will come to pass if action is not taken. Example 2 is the same, but it quantifies the risk, which makes it stronger. Example 3 is the same, but characterizes it as a reward for acting, not a penalty for failing to act. As you express your negotiation outcomes to the other side, think about which method of these sorts will provide you with the most effective outcome.
One thing that R.I.M. did in the negotiation was to offer alternatives to the countries with which they were negotiating. They offered certain types of access with thoughts about how that type of access might solve the problem that the country expressed. Those problems varied – for example, anti-terrorism concerns or organized-crime concerns. This is a useful step to take in negotiations. Before you just give the other side what they want, make sure that you understand the problem you are trying to solve. R.I.M. made some good attempts at that.
Additional leverage was brought to bear on R.I.M. by corporate users of the service. Data security is a key selling point for R.I.M. and those corporate users reasonably brought their issues into the conversation. Although it is common enough for data to be reviewed under legal order, wholesale review is not so simple to swallow.
The last leverage issue works against certain of the countries in their requests. If you are a middle-Eastern country in the process of building up your reputation as “business friendly”, then access for businesses to services considered “essential” becomes leverage against you in this fight.
When you think about leverage, remember to think about it from both sides, not just your own. (td)
Got a question? Email a K&R negotiator directly at [email protected].
